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What is a Political Value?: Political Philosophy and Fidelity to Reality  
 
'That is not only not right, it is not even wrong' 
Attributed to Wolfgang Pauli 
 
Most of us have at best a hazy understanding of what politics is. Even those who 'do' politics in 
the sense of either living 'for' or 'from' it (to employ Max Weber's distinction), journalists, 
politicians, civil servants, party officials and volunteers, campaigners, lobbyists and so on, are 
unlikely to have anything more that an indistinct view of what the activity is that they are 
engaged in. Among this list we might add contemporary political philosophers also, who, at least 
in the analytical Anglo-American tradition, have in recent decades given relatively little 
consideration to the question of the nature of the phenomenon they study, preferring to focus 
instead on normative questions about the values and ends that political activity should be 
oriented towards achieving.1 These are important questions: how societies answer them matters 
and political philosophy certainly has something to contribute to those inquiries. But we might 
think that political philosophy ought not to concern itself with the nature of actual political 
practice anyhow, that to do so would be to contaminate the purity of philosophical reflection 
with the messiness and contingency of real politics.  
 This paper shall argue the opposite: the actual practice of politics places particular 
constraints on political philosophy which theorists ought to be sensitive to. Put differently, 
political philosophy should be appropriately guided by the practice of politics to which it seeks to 
speak about and to. This is not, as we will see, driven by the now familiar concern (of non-ideal 
theory) that contemporary political philosophy has become overly abstract and hence cannot 
offer action-guiding recommendations for us here and now.2 The central claim is rather more in 
keeping with the realist vein of contemporary political philosophy: that despite the inevitable 
need for abstraction and idealisation, any theory has to retain an appropriate degree of fidelity to 
the phenomenon that it theorises in order to be a theory of and for that phenomenon. 3 
Whatever else it might abstract or idealise away, there are certain facts about the actual nature of 
politics which any political philosophy should take as given.  
 This paper examines the form such fidelity must take and the limits it places on political 
philosophy, and it does so primarily through the question of political values. It begins by arguing 
that a political value has to be consistent with the constitutive features of politics as a human 
activity. The point here is not to draw a sharp distinction between moral values and political 
values, but to say that the phenomenon of politics itself provides conditions against which any 
value - including but not limited to moral values - must be consistent if it is to be a value for the 
political domain. Political values may have their origin outside of politics, but for them to 
function as values for the political domain, i.e. become a value we aspire to realise in practice,  a 
standard of evaluation against which we assess the actions of political agents, or a category 
through which we seek to understand political life, it must be possible for us to view them as 
consistent with its constitutive features. The following section then examines the extent to which 
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the preconditions for the realisation of values in practice ought to figure in our considerations as 
to whether they are values suitable for our society. One way of thinking about these sections is as 
responding to two different but related questions we can ask of values: respectively, 'is this a 
political value?' which is to say, is it a value that is appropriate for the political realm, and then 'is 
this a political value for us?', which is to ask the further question as to how far it might be a value 
that fits or belongs to our social world (which includes but is not exhausted by potential 
concerns about whether it makes sense for us to aspire to realise that value here and now). The 
final section then responds to David Estlund's claim, taken as representative of a particular form 
of ideal theory, that it is not a defect of a political philosophy if it pays no heed to the realities of 
politics. Distinguishing between a theory of politics and a theory of a particular political value 
(e.g. justice, freedom, etc.), I shall argue that in the case of the former it is the constitutive 
features of politics that provide the conditions which give meaning to the enterprise as an 
exercise in theorising politics. Moreover, and in response to the claim of ideal theory that the 
meaning of political values can be understood quite independently from any account of the 
character of the political domain, I suggest that the meaning of a political value can only be 
ascertained within an at least minimally plausible description of politics as a distinct sphere of 
human activity. In these ways it is wrong to maintain that political philosophy need not concede 
anything to political reality.  
 
The General Conditions of Politics 
Politics is a particular sort of human activity. It may be related to other spheres of human life, 
such as morality, economics, and law, for example, but it cannot be reduced to any of them.4 
One way of thinking about the specificity of political domains is in terms of its constitutive 
features, those facets of political life that are both essential to politics and help distinguish it 
from other social practices. These features, by virtue of being essential elements of politics, 
ought also to be taken as given or fixed points in any philosophy of politics (so I wish to claim). 
Taking the theorisation of political values as our example, in order for values to be meaningfully 
understood as values for the political domain they have to be consistent with its constitutive 
features. These constitutive features we can call the general conditions of politics insofar as they are 
necessary features of a specifically political domain and, therefore, conditions that any value must 
be consistent with in order to be a value for that sphere of human activity. By focusing our 
attention on what must be true of politics as a particular sort of practice we can get a handle on 
the ways in which that practice itself provides conditions of intelligibility for any appropriate 
theoretical or philosophical reflection upon it. It is to be expected that people will disagree as to 
what these conditions might include, thought it is important to recognise that the claim about 
the need to take seriously the general conditions of politics is distinct from claims about what 
those conditions might be. Nevertheless, as a way of exploring what it would mean for a political 
philosophy to be consistent (or not) with the general conditions, I shall here focus on what I take 
to be three strong candidates for inclusion grounded in a particular (broadly realist) way of 
understanding the nature of the political: that politics is an attempt to provide order via authority 
and legitimate coercion in conditions of disagreement.5  
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Disagreement. Politics is a response to and necessarily takes place in contexts where a group of 
people require a commonly binding decisions on subjects deemed to be of public concern but 
over which there is disagreement, so, to give some illustrative examples: questions over the 
distribution of public goods; how the burdens of taxation ought to fall across the population; 
whether the state should provide public health care; if abortion should be illegal; what the 
relationship between the state and the church should be; the need for conscription and 
compulsory education; where the limits of free speech and toleration should be drawn; whether 
minority groups ought to have special rights, and so on. Our disagreements are not only about 
ends, however. We regularly disagree as much about the means for pursuing our collective ends 
as we do about what those ends should be. Even if we agree that the richest ought to pay the 
highest percentage of tax, for instance, there will still be disputes as to the most efficient and fair 
way of collecting that revenue from them. Moreover, individuals will often be committed to 
competing and incompatible normative and conceptual frameworks for coming to collective 
decisions. Unlike the natural sciences, there is no consensus upon the right methodology or 
epistemology for determining public policy issues (Christian, utilitarian, socialist, conservative, 
Kantian, Marxist, Nietzschean, liberal, etc.).6 Hence we find ourselves in the ominous position of 
not only disagreeing what to do but of disagreeing as to the right justifications and 
considerations that ought to bear on the decision as to how we ought to collectively proceed.   
 Politics is a response to, and necessarily takes place in, these contexts of disagreement 
and conflict as to what should be done, what Jeremy Waldron has usefully called 'the 
circumstances of politics'.7 This makes it important to distinguish, as he remarked elsewhere, the 
question of what we ought to do and what we ought to do when we disagree about what we 
ought to do.8 While we will all have our views on the first question, politics is specifically geared 
towards providing an answer to the second. It is also important for the character of politics, and 
for reasons that we shall come to shortly, that our disagreements about what should be done 
very often remain even after a collective decision has been made. The circumstances of politics 
are not resolved once a judgement has been reached, but provides the permanent backdrop 
against which politics takes place. This is in large part why the notions of authority and 
legitimacy must be central to any plausible understanding of politics. 
 
Authority. Politics does not have its own substantial content other than to provide order among 
people who require commonly binding decisions. While there might be many ways in which 
collective decisions could be reached in conditions of disagreement, a lottery or the imposition 
of one party's will for instance, politics seeks to settle disputes via authority. It may well be 
possible to settle disputes through brute force alone but we readily recognise that this is to rule 
coercively not authoritatively, or, in other words, to not rule politically at all. Political rule is 
authoritative rule. In an authoritative order the ruled obey the rulers because they recognise that 
their decisions have a certain sort of normative force which creates obligations on them to obey. 
These obligations are taken to hold (within limits) regardless of whether an individual takes it to 
be in their interest to obey or whether they disagree with the decision taken. Politics is therefore 
characterised by a particular sort of relationship of rule whereby the rulers commands are 
transformed into authoritative decisions that those subject to it are obliged to obey.  
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Legitimate coercion. To claim to rule authoritatively is to claim that there is some normative (but 
not yet necessarily moral) ground which justifies the de jure right to have one's decisions obeyed. 
That is to say, political rule must also be legitimate rule. And so any political order must be 
intelligible to those who live under it as a form of legitimated power.9 It is by virtue of the fact 
that the authority is legitimate that its decisions possess the requisite normative force to 
transform what might otherwise be conformity due to threat of overwhelming force into a sense 
in which the decisions of the rulers create obligations on the ruled to obey, regardless of whether 
they agree with those decisions or not. This need is most pressing when we consider that any 
authority must be empowered to coercively enforce its decisions upon those over whom it has 
dominion, for we assume that, given the ineradicability of disagreement, it is always likely that 
there will be at least some, and sometimes many, who disagree with the decision that has been 
taken. As Mark Philp has put it, 'part of what makes rule political is that it is exercised over 
others who are not inevitably compliant'.10 In a successful political order, the majority of people 
will conform with its decisions on the grounds that it is taken to be a legitimate authority. Yet the 
need for an enforcement agency which has the ability to impose solutions, where necessary 
through coercion, remains intrinsic to politics for without it there is always the risk that 
disagreements will unravel into the unrestrained conflicts of interest and values that politics is 
intended to resolve. This capacity may only be a last resort to which an authority must have 
recourse, and there will always be good reason for associations to try and replace coercion, which 
can often be inefficient, with more indirect inducements to obedience.11 Nevertheless, and for 
whatever reason, full compliance will not always be forthcoming and in such scenarios a political 
order must have not only the de facto ability to secure obedience through coercive force (or the 
threat of it) but the de jure right to do so also. And so it matters for the question of whether a 
form of rule is political whether those who live under it see themselves as obeying merely out of 
fear of coercion or because they understand their situation as one of being subject to a legitimate 
authority that creates normatively binding collective decisions. 
 
Politics is a practice characterised by disagreement, authority and legitimate coercion. It may be 
characterised by much else besides, but these are at least some of the characteristics of the 
human practice or activity that political theories seek to be about and the context in which 
political values are asserted, claimed, debated, critiqued, and so on. Being constitutive of 
politics, political values must take them as fixed features of the political domain. This means that 
for a value to be a value for politics it must be fully consistent with their presence. It cannot be 
incompatible with the general conditions such that a belief about a value is inconsistent with any 
particular constitutive feature of politics (e.g. political freedom is the absence of political 
authority), nor, as an assumption built into the understanding of the value itself, can it depend 
upon the general conditions being overcome for their realisation in practice. In such cases the 
value would not be a value for the political domain but for a world in which politics or the need 
for politics is absent (which is, and whatever else we might think about the attractiveness of such 
a world, not our own). It would not be a value suitable for the activity of politics.  
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 As a way of fixing ideas it will be helpful to try and give some examples of how values 
might be found inadequate in this way. First of all, political values have to make sense in 
conditions of disagreement. An elaboration of a value that wishes away such contestation is 
going to be inappropriate for any political space. For instance, a conception of freedom which 
assumed that a free society would be one in which all people shared the same ends or values, or 
even only the same conceptual framework for making decisions on matters of public concern, 
would not be political insofar as it assumes the absence of the disagreement to which politics 
responds. The value of freedom makes most sense precisely in conditions where we disagree 
what to do (a point we shall return to shortly). Likewise (and to use an example defended by 
Andrew Mason in his contribution to this issue), if a theory of justice requires that all people 
endorse the same principles in order for a society to be fully just - so that they are motivated by 
the commitment to acting justly rather than in response to threats of punishment and sanctions - 
then this is clearly inconsistent with the general condition of disagreement also. Our 
disagreements about justice are among the deepest and most prevalent that divide us, and it is for 
this reason that providing commonly binding decisions on matters of justice is one of the most 
important tasks of any political order. To think that a fully just society would be one in which all 
people converged on the same principles of justice is, in an important sense, to put the 
possibility of full justice outside of the political realm and into a world devoid of much of the 
original impetus for politics in the first place.12 That might be an admirable vision of society, but 
it cannot be a political society. 
 A failure to take sufficiently seriously disagreement can often also lead to a similar failure 
to pay sufficient heed to the need for political authority and the possibility of legitimate coercion. 
One set of problematic values with which we are familiar from both the history of political 
thought and more contemporary work are those which deny that politics requires coercion at all 
insofar as freedom, justice, democracy, autonomy, or legitimacy demand that we only obey those 
laws which we can represent as being ourselves the co-authors of. Under such interpretations, 
often Rousseauean or Kantian in inspiration, we are only free, the political association only 
legitimate, and so on, insofar as we obey only our own will. Politics is a sphere antithetical to 
being ruled by others. Yet the point of political order is precisely to provide an authoritative 
decision in conditions of disagreement about what should be done ('what we ought to do when 
we disagree what we ought to do'), and to enable the legitimate coercion of those who would not 
otherwise comply where necessary. To assume that people can or will agree, even if only 
hypothetically, such that they can all obey the law and yet only obey themselves is to theorise for 
a scenario in which these general conditions, and hence the possibility of legitimate coercion 
also, are absent. That position denies the very possibility of being forced to act against your will 
that seems inevitable once you accept that politics takes place in a space of genuine disagreement 
which necessitates an authority that is not only able to decide but to legitimately enforce its 
decisions. It is for this reason that the problem that Rousseau sets himself in his Social Contract, to 
'Find a form of association which will defend and protect, with the whole of its joint strength, 
the person and property of each associate, and under which each of them, uniting himself to all, will obey 
himself alone, and remain as free as before', can only be answered by rejecting the incongruity between 
force and freedom.13 Yet the best route for political theory is not to deny that the tension 
between legitimate coercion and freedom exists, nor to try and dissolve that experience through 
philosophical ingenuity, but to help us try and find ways to live with it in an acceptable manner. 
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 Recognising that politics necessarily entails the possibility of obeying a will other than 
your own means that we should acknowledge how politics inevitably imposes costs in terms of 
freedom. The prevalence of disagreement and contestation ensures there will always be cases 
where we find our government pursuing policies in the name of particular interpretations of 
values such as justice or equality with which we disagree, and which we rightly experience as a 
restriction of our activities. And this is true even when we fully recognise the political order as 
having the right to make such commonly-binding decisions. In such scenarios it seems 
reasonable to resent such restrictions for curtailing our freedom in the way that they do. An 
appropriate conception of freedom for politics therefore has to recognise such costs and make 
them consistent with what it can mean to live in a free political society. However, any value 
which gave us reason to resent the mere presence of an authority with the right to coercively 
enforce its collectively-binding decisions does not deserve to be taken seriously as a conception 
appropriate for the political realm. A freedom which does not allow for the need for 
authoritative government with the right of legitimate coercion cannot be a political conception 
of freedom. Such values, if they exist, would not belong to politics.14 
 
The Preconditions of Political Values 
What has been suggested so far is that a distinctively political value has to be consistent with the 
general conditions of politics. If they are not then by virtue of the fact that they are inconsistent 
with its necessary constitutive features they cannot be in any meaningful sense values for the 
political domain. There is a related but importantly different question that we might ask of 
political values also - whether it can be a value for us given facts of the political society of which 
we are a part. One good way of getting to this issue is via Bernard Williams' discussion of 'Saint 
Just's Illusion'. 
 Saint-Just was a Jacobin leader notorious for the zeal with which he conducted the 
Terror in his attempt to remake French society according to the ideals of civic virtue associated 
with the Roman Empire. The human devastation caused by Saint-Just's attempt to impose 
republican ideals on French society was clearly an ethical travesty, and we can rightly construct 
ethical arguments against his actions. Yet there were several dimensions to his mistake, and his 
failure of ethical understanding was only one of those. One other dimension was of historical 
interpretation. As Benjamin Constant noted in his essay distinguishing between the liberty of the 
ancients and the moderns, the ancient conception of liberty employed by the Jacobins, which 
revolved around and depended upon very strong individual dedication to public life, was 
calamitously unsuited to the modern world. This trades on a fairly common thought that 'the 
preconditions of political freedom vary with different social formations', and that, whatever we 
might take those preconditions to be, where they are absent that conception of freedom is not 
going to be able to satisfy the need for freedom of that society.15 In itself, overlooking the 
historical preconditions of republican liberty might be fairly harmless, though in Saint-Just's case 
this was conjoined with a further - more political - error: a failure to understand the difference 
between two different sorts of spaces that we rightly and naturally treat differently. The first  
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is the space of our actual social and political life, within which we encounter 
various political and ethical demands and ideals, argue with them, adapt 
ourselves to them, try to form a conception of an acceptable life within them. 
The other space, of which we may be conscious only in a very shadowy way, is 
of other conceptions and ideals and world pictures that human beings have 
had, and may perhaps still have elsewhere, which are not part of our social and 
political space, are not even starters for a life we might now lead, and are - 
strictly in that sense - alien to us.16 
 
Saint-Just mistook the ideals of Roman republicanism as belonging in that first space, when 
really it was so incompatible with late 18th-century French conditions as to render it an 
impossibility as a way of life. To be sure, his French contemporaries could recognise 
republicanism as expressing human ideals, and knew that a historical story could be told that 
linked those ideals to their own (as we can today). But Ancient Rome was a world so different 
from theirs in terms of its social structures, economic forms and people's needs, beliefs and 
motivations that these values had no place in the space of their actual social and political lives.17 
The delusion from which he suffered, his 'illusion', was to mistake his utopian vision of the way 
he wanted the world to be from the way it actually was.  
 It is important to recognise that the general mistake illustrated by Saint-Just is not to be 
thought of as a conceptual or philosophical error. It was rather a failure of social and political 
understanding whereby we take a particular value to belong to our political and social world 
when it does not. And not because it cannot be made sense of in relation to the general 
conditions of any political association, but because it relies upon a conception of a social world 
that is at too great a distance from our actual world, where that distance 'must be measured in 
terms of political considerations of relevance and practical intelligibility'.18 Saint-Just was not 
wrong in thinking that republican freedom represented a politically coherent elaboration of 
freedom, he rather misjudged the extent to which 18th century France possessed the 
preconditions for republican liberty and in doing so missed the point that what was liberty for 
the Romans could not be liberty for his fellow Frenchmen.  
 The general point to take from the example of Saint-Just is that if a society lacks the 
preconditions necessary for a value then it cannot be a value for those people, even if it is 
consistent with the general conditions of politics. That value might properly speaking be 
considered a political value, but it cannot be a political value for them. They simply do not 
represent values that can be integrated into a life they can coherently lead. Examples of such 
values for us today may include: conceptions of justice that rely upon a high level of moral and 
religious harmony which does not pertain in diverse societies such as ours; of aristocratic or war-
based interpretations of the virtues of dignity or honour; of freedom if they take basic economic 
competition to be a violation of what we are at liberty to pursue when modern societies are 
commerce societies; of democracy if it requires sustained direct participation from its citizens in 
a culture of widespread political disengagement and disenchantment; of basic rights if certain 
groups are not to be afforded them by virtue of their ethnicity, race or religion; or of equality 
that depends upon higher levels of class solidarity than currently exists. It is vital to stress that 
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there are many questions in play here, all of which are rightly to be thought of as matters of 
political judgement: What are the preconditions of any particular value? Do they hold in our 
present society? If they do not, just how out of reach for us are they? The latter question may be 
particularly difficult to answer given that it requires a further judgement about how far the future 
will look like the present. We must always allow for politics' ability to surprise us - sometimes 
dramatically so - but this does not mean that there is no such thing as a considered judgement 
that can be reached on these matters. Certainly philosophy will not be able to determine any of 
these questions via its own resources alone and hence cannot simply assume a particular answer 
in advance, despite how amenable it may be to an author's favoured values. To get anywhere 
near the truth of the matter it is crucial that our judgements be guided by a sensitive, sincere and 
truthful understanding of how our society is structured, the ways in which its main institutions 
and practices function, and its peoples' actual beliefs and motivations. To engage in wishful 
thinking, or indeed the different but related temptation to simply wish away such features of our 
context as mere inconveniences in the face of our preferred ideal, runs the risk of falling prey to 
Saint-Just's illusion and failing to heed the difference between our actual social and political 
space and those in which our preferred ideals might represent viable options.  
 
Ideal Theory and Fidelity to Reality 
What has come to be known as ideal theory really represents a spectrum of positions. One such 
position is identifiable by its being the target of non-ideal theory. This is essentially a dispute 
regarding the extent to which facts as to the likelihood that a normative theory might be realised 
in practice ought to impinge on our evaluation of that theory. Is a theory defective if it is being 
proposed for a society that lacks the preconditions for its realisation, or potentially more 
worryingly, if the preconditions for its application could not realistically be expected of any 
human society? Is it to be considered a deficiency of a theory if it is insufficiently sensitive to 
feasibility constraints which limit what is possible and in doing so effectively renders itself unable 
to provide 'action-guiding' recommendations for us here and now? What if human nature is such 
that it is highly improbable that people would be able to live by particular principles of justice? 
Ought that to count against those principles?19 Non-ideal theorists tend to answer yes to these 
questions, though there is considerable disagreement as to how facts of human nature or other 
feasibility constraints ought to alter how we go about doing political philosophy, especially in its 
normative guise. 20  Ideal theorists, on the other hand, reject such considerations. As David 
Estlund has argued in his influential articulation of ideal theory: 'moral theories of social justice, 
political authority, political legitimacy, and many other moral-political concepts are not shown to 
have any defect in virtue of the fact, if it is one, that the alleged requirements or preconditions of 
these things are not likely ever to be met'.21 More succinctly, '... the truth about justice is not 
constrained by considerations of the likelihood of success in realising it ...'.22 According to ideal 
theory, the objective of political philosophy is to take up a perspective on politics that, through 
abstraction and idealisation, is unencumbered by facts pertaining to the plausibility that a theory 
might ever be realised in practice. These are quite irrelevant to the philosophers' task of getting at 
the truth of the matter. Philosophy is charged, as G. A. Cohen memorably answered, with telling 
us what to think rather than what to do, 'even when what we should think makes no practical 
difference'.23 If it turns out that justice is not realisable in this world, maybe in any human world, 
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then as deeply regrettable as that may be at least we know what justice is. And that is not nothing 
for, as Estlund argues, there is value in understanding something of value.24 
 The concerns I want to pursue here in light of what has already been argued are 
somewhat orthogonal to those expressed in the ideal/non-ideal theory debate, and are more 
closely associated with political realism.25 It is therefore important to be clear that my target is a 
particular form of ideal theory, and one which might not include the work of certain - nevertheless 
quite prominent - ideal theorists such as John Rawls (which may give us good reason to be 
sceptical that the term 'ideal theory' remains of much use). Whereas ideal and non-ideal theorists 
are concerned with the question of whether the applicability or realisability of a theory of (say) 
justice in any way ought to feature in our evaluations of it, the claim I want to focus on and 
reject is that the nature of the political domain ought not to impinge on our theorisation of it, 
including in determining the meaning of political values.  
 Estlund's own version of ideal theory rejects both the non-ideal and realist charges. 
Addressing the latter, he imagines a realist objection to a theory the structure of which goes 
something like this:  
 
It is characteristic of political societies that they have laws and law enforcement 
agencies (e.g. police, judges, and juries) 
If all people acted moral flawlessly then there would be no need for law and 
law enforcement agencies (allowing for the fact that not all crime is immoral) 
Therefore any theory that assumes people act morally flawlessly cannot be a 
political theory 
 
'Would it [such a theory] be assuming away politics itself?' he asks. 'If so that sounds like a fatal 
defect in a political philosophy'.26 Estlund's response to his own question is worth quoting in full:  
 
A lot of work is being done in this objection by a definition. A theory’s subject 
matter is asserted to lie outside of politics unless it grants a substantial role to 
laws, police, criminal courts, and so on. Consider a theory that gave compelling 
arguments for the conclusion that a society could not be characterized by 
political justice, or authority, or legitimacy in conditions where there was a 
substantial role for laws, police, and courts. On the definition of politics in 
question, this would not be a political philosophy. But that is only because politics 
has been defined out from under it. Fine, let it not count as a political philosophy. 
This would leave entirely intact its claim to have the correct theory of justice, 
authority, and legitimacy.27 
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Estlund's focuses here on law and law enforcement because he has chosen to address the specific 
fact (if it is a fact) that people will never be moral angels, but I assume that the point is intended 
to be quite generalisable: that it is no defect of a political theory if it does not take adequate 
account of the nature of politics. And certainly such facts about politics do not impinge on the 
meaning of political values. I want to challenge both of these claims on the grounds that they 
violate what I take to be a general requirement for the theorisation of any phenomenon: that a 
theory must be consistent with the necessary constitutive features of a phenomenon, those 
without which it would not be the sort of phenomenon it is, in order to be a theory of that 
phenomenon. If it is not, then it lacks the requisite fidelity to the phenomenon that it seeks to be 
a theory of, and hence cannot be a theory for it either. 
 Moving by analogy is likely to be helpful here. To begin with an admittedly crude 
scientific analogue: Imagine a scenario in which a precocious young scientist claims to have 
discovered that all previous theories of how and why hydrogen (in its most common isotopic 
form) reacts the way that it does with other elements are incorrect, and that she, during her 
doctoral research, has developed a better theory. When she published her research, however, it 
turns out that the theory only works if we assume that hydrogen has two protons, two neutrons 
and two electrons. What would the right response to her theory be given we know that in reality 
hydrogen has only one proton, no neutrons and a single electron? The theory might have the 
virtue of being internally coherent on its own terms, free from any contradictions, flawed 
reasoning, or inconsistencies. But even if that were true we would nevertheless insist that it is still 
a bad theory, though bad in the very specific sense that it is not a theory of hydrogen because of 
what we know to be true of the composition of hydrogen atoms: it fails to qualify as a theory of 
hydrogen at all (this is what is taken to be meant by the phrase, attributed to the physicist Wolfgang 
Pauli, 'That is not only not right, it is not even wrong'). 
 Social practices like politics are quite obviously different from atoms, and it would clearly 
be a mistake to think that a theory for the former needs to fulfil the same epistemic requirements 
or human needs as the latter (not least of enabling accurate and repeatable predictions). But 
nevertheless it remains a common requirement that for something to qualify as a valid theory of 
a particular phenomenon it has to take its constitutive features as given. So let us move to an 
analogy of a theory of a human practice that might be deficient in this regard.  
 Imagine that you and your partner are expecting your first child and, as nervous parents-
to-be, you sign up to a course on 'What makes a good parent?' led by someone who claims to be 
an expert in bringing up children. You arrive at the first session and the expert begins by 
declaring that 'Parenting is a voluntary economic relationship between two adults with the aim of 
maximising profit'. The expert then goes on to set out a series of ideals of good parenting and 
the values with which it should be concerned in light of that understanding of what parenting is: 
Parents ought to be assessed according to how much profit they make from their dealings with 
their children; the maximisation of profit is the ideal to which parenting should be orientated; 
parents have no natural duties of care or compassion to their children and are free to enter into a 
parenting relationship with anyone they please as long as both parties consent; any obligations 
that do pertain between parents and their children only arise as the result of a freely made 
agreements between the two parties, and which both parties are free to leave within the terms of 
the agreement itself; parenting is a relationship between individuals who are equal in terms of 
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rationality and hence are both to be understood as fully responsible for their decisions; and so 
on. It is obvious that the right response to this 'expert' would be to profoundly disagree with 
him. But about what should we disagree?  
 At one level the disagreement will be about what makes a good parent, and one would 
likely disregard his ideals as wrong and highly improper. But what has really gone wrong is not 
simply that he is offering a bad theory of parenting, but that he has not offered a theory of 
parenting at all. He fails to be an expert on the practice he claims to have expertise. What he has to 
say simply misses the mark in terms of being a theory for the practice of being a parent. And the 
reason why it does so is because it mischaracterises or outright fails to recognise what we would 
usually take to be constitutive features of parenting as a particular practice and form of human 
relationship which is crucially different from other practices such as economic exchange or, 
more closely, friendship. Such features might include that it is primarily an ethical not economic 
relationship; that parenting takes place within a family unit (however defined) where certain 
individuals have particular special responsibilities for their children, and will usually include that 
period from birth until the child becomes an adult (with the assumption that the two parties are 
not equal in terms of rationality and responsibility until that point); that it will be a relationship in 
which the virtues of love and care will be central; that its end cannot be profit; that it might be 
voluntary but it need not always be (or at least certainly should not be conceived 
straightforwardly in those terms); etc. While this is to disagree with the theory being offered, it is 
crucial that the disagreement hinges on the question of whether it is a theory that resembles any 
plausible description of the practice of parenting. This is a matter over which there will be 
legitimate disagreement, and it goes without saying that there are significant disputes as to what it 
means to be a parent. But at the very least there will be certain descriptions of the practice that 
we would normally recognise as thoroughly implausible or deeply mistaken (such as the one 
offered by our expert). In lacking any appreciation of what we might take as constitutive features 
of the practice of parenting we can say that it cannot function as a theory of parenting, by virtue 
of which neither can its ideals function as ideals for the practice of being a parent (and that holds 
even if it might be a plausible ideal for other human relationships).28 
 To bring this back to politics: the first of Estlund's claims was that it is no defect of a 
political theory if it does not take adequate account of what politics actually is. Indeed, Estlund's 
defence of ideal theory on this point makes it sound very much as if he considers the question of 
whether something is to be thought of as political philosophy as merely a semantic issue, a matter 
of competing stipulations of what politics can mean (maybe of the even less important question 
of what the disciplinary boundaries ought to be between political and moral philosophy). And 
because these are just competing stipulations it cannot be a defect of a political theory if it fails 
to 'grant a substantial role' to the content of any. These analogies have suggested that the 
contrary is true. It was clearly a defect of the scientist's theory that it failed to work with an 
adequate (in this case we would say true) account of the actual composition of hydrogen atoms. 
The parenting expert employed what we would consider an erroneous or flawed understanding 
of what the practice of being a parent consists of. In both cases the failure can be expressed in 
terms of not being a theory of the phenomenon which they seek to theorise. That failure of 
fidelity to its phenomenon gives us cause to doubt whether what is being is offered is indeed a 
theory of that particular phenomenon. By analogy, whether a political theory works with a 
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plausible description or understanding of the practice of politics should also be taken as crucial 
in helping us evaluate whether it truly is a theory of the political domain, and not something else 
(or, indeed, a theory of nothing insofar as there is no phenomena to which it relates). A political 
theory is deficient if it is unintelligible as a theory of politics. Politics is, of course, more like 
parenting than hydrogen not least in that it too is a human practice that stands in need of 
interpretation, which means that it is perfectly reasonable to expect there to be competing 
accounts of the character of the political domain (there are less likely to be competing accounts 
of what hydrogen is). Yet we rightly think there are better and worse, more or less plausible, 
descriptions of politics. Especially where the description is wildly implausible we have good 
reason to critique those theories as not being theories of politics, in the same way as we can 
criticise the expert on the grounds that he failed to offer a theory of parenting. It might be a 
theory of something else, economics, morality, law, etc. but it cannot be taken seriously as a 
theory of politics. So it would hardly seem appropriate to think of that qualification, which 
necessitates a concern with the actual nature of politics, as irrelevant to the task of political 
philosophy.  
 Of course, the claim against Estlund's ideal theory cannot be that it makes the same 
elementary mistake as the scientist or the parenting expert in working with an implausible 
description of politics. That cannot be the claim because his response to the realist charge was 
that ideal theory need not employ any description of politics at all. The worry is not that ideal 
theory makes factual errors, but that it does not think facts about politics matter either way. Yet 
the point of the analogies was to show that it is a failing of a theory if it cannot reasonably be 
understood as a theory of its purported phenomenon, and that in order to make that assessment 
we need to ask if it works with a plausible description of what it seeks to be a theory of. And so 
if we do not know what politics is, then we cannot know that what we are talking about or trying 
to understand is politics.29 The concern for ideal theory is that this assessment cannot be made 
without reference to an account of the political domain that it denies is required. And so we are 
left with no criteria for assessing whether what ideal theory offers is really a political theory, a 
theory for the political realm, or a theory of something else altogether. Here theory must concede to 
reality.  
 Part of what seemingly encourages Estlund to dismiss these concerns about the fidelity 
of a political theory to political reality is an assumption that questions as to the actual character 
of politics can only be matters of arbitrary stipulation or argument by definition. There is little 
reason to think this is right. Few would deny that there is no distinction between true and false 
beliefs about politics, and certainly our confidence in that need not be undermined by any 
concern that that distinction cannot be drawn with the greatest precision, nor that there is no 
supra-human vantage point available from which we can identify such beliefs once and for all.30 
Indeed, we have many theoretical and empirical resources which can help us understand the 
nature of the political domain and distinguish more from less plausible accounts. As we have 
seen, no particularly sophisticated theory is required in order to assess certain accounts as wildly 
implausible by any reasonable standard, and such accounts can usually be recognised as such by 
most people. This is unlikely to exclude much that any sensible person would propose (the 
analogies offered above were purposefully outlandish to demonstrate a point), but we should not 
think that it excludes everything. Philosophy's tools of abstract reasoning and conceptual analysis 
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can also get us some not inconsiderable distance in helping us think through what a coherent 
theory of politics is going to look like. Yet what counts as a credible description ought to rely as 
much on empirical considerations as it does more conceptual inquiries regarding the nature of 
politics. The resources of abstract reason such as conceptual analysis will play an important role 
but can only get us so far, at which point our understanding will need to be supplemented by 
empirical considerations and the sort of analysis that is provided by other fields such as 
anthropology, sociology, economics, psychology, and history. Political philosophy has to 
therefore be highly impure, not in the sense of turning to the real world once we have in view 
the ideal which we now wish to put into practice, but in terms of using our best understanding of 
what politics is like, how it functions, its limits, ends and means, to set the very conditions of 
what is going to count as philosophising about politics at all.31 This is not mere stipulation, but 
rather being guided by the best understanding of politics we can muster.32 And certainly it is not 
philosophy alone that is going to get to adjudicate on the question of whether a theory 
appropriately comprehends politics or not. 
 Estlund's second line of defence is that even if we grant the claim that a theory which 
does not take into account relevant facts of politics should not be called political philosophy, that 
does not impinge in any way on its ability to get at the truth of political values. Here Estlund's 
argument seems to trade on an implicit demarcation between theories of politics and theories of political 
values that is worth making explicit. Theories of politics provide an account of what politics is. In 
doing so they also help us explain why politics is the sort of activity it is and not something else, 
and potentially its relationship to other human activities also. It is these theories that I have been 
arguing so far need to take the constitutive features of politics as given in order to be 
meaningfully understood as theories of politics (and that it is a failure of a theory if it cannot be 
understood in this way). Attempts to provide theories of politics have fallen somewhat out of 
fashion in recent decades, though 20th century texts such as Carl Schmitt's The Concept of the 
Political, Michael Oakeshott's On Human Conduct, Sheldon Wolin's Vision on Politics, Bernard 
Crick's In Defence of Politics, and Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition demonstrate that such lack 
of interest in the question 'what is politics?' is a relatively recent development.33 Theories of 
political values seek to elucidate the meaning or content of particular political values, and the 
exemplar of this way of doing political theory in recent decades remains John Rawls' A Theory of 
Justice.34 Estlund (like Cohen) rightly takes ideal theory to be a theory of political values rather 
than of politics insofar as its aim is to uncover the meaning of justice, freedom, and so on. And 
his response to the realist charge above indicates that he thinks these theories are sufficiently 
independent at least to the extent that one can provide a theory of political value without also 
needing or presuming any theory of politics, and, furthermore, that even if there were some 
connection between the two, a defect of a political philosophy that it were not political would 
not have any bearing on a theory of political values. The meaning and content of political values, 
Estlund claims, does not to depend upon any particular stipulation or description of politics.   
 Yet as the example of the parenting expert demonstrates, the descriptive and the 
normative cannot be so easily separated. A theory of the values appropriate for any practice is 
going to depend upon a viable account of the practice in which those values are to function as 
ideals to be realised, normative standards of assessment, or categories of understanding. Put 
differently, a plausible description of the practice must precede the provision of a normative 
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theory for it. If it does not, then just as the ideals and judgements of our parenting expert were 
found to be deficient because they took parenting to be something other than it really is, the 
same will likely be true of those offered by political theorists. Flawed political recommendations 
will inexorably follow from false beliefs about the political sphere to which they are supposed to 
apply. We should quite expect that the values and ideals appropriate for a domain characterised 
by one set of constitutive features would not be appropriate for a very different domain where 
those features do not hold. It would be surprising, for instance, if it turned out to be of little 
consequences for the question of what a free society would look like whether disagreement and 
the use of legitimate coercion were constitutive features of political orders or not. Likewise, we 
should surely think it pertinent to the question of equality in political societies whether political 
power and authority has to be asymmetrically distributed among its populace or whether that is 
only a transient feature of pre-egalitarian politics. In this sense, the meaning and content of 
values cannot be understood separate from the domain in which they are to function and the 
activity which they are intended to help guide. Again, those are not judgements one can make 
without some appreciation of what makes politics the specific sort of practice that it is, which of 
its features are fixed and which can be changed. And this is a condition that pertains to 
normative judgements or prescriptions derived from any non-political sphere applied to politics, 
such as economics, religion, or technology, as much as morality (as Estlund explicitly conceives 
of the findings of ideal theory, hence his talk of 'moral theories of social justice, political 
authority, political legitimacy, and many other moral-political concepts ...'). To reiterate an 
important point made in the introduction, the point here is not to draw a strict demarcation 
between moral and political values (or political and other values, for that matter), but rather to 
insist that we should hesitate before taking any value seriously as appropriate to the political 
domain by virtue of its being in whatever other sense desirable, attractive, or preferable. 
 Any suggestion that reality ought to play some role in constraining or determining 
philosophical reflection upon politics, especially when it is engaging in normative considerations 
of what should be done, what justice demands, and the like, often come up against the criticism 
that this makes them objectionably conservative or disagreeably status-quo affirming insofar as it 
allows reality to constrain the possibility of radical critique or undermine the possibility of 
positing utopian visions of how life might be otherwise. This worry is misplaced. Remember that 
it is only those values and ideals that are inconsistent with the general conditions of politics that 
are inappropriate for the political realm. This will not be an empty category of possible values, 
and certainly it will include interpretations that some political philosophers have offered 
throughout the ages, including today. But there is no reason to expect that it rules out anywhere 
near as much as it potentially allows. What can count as political values for us or any other 
society will always be a subset of all possible political values simply by virtue of the fact that no 
political order can possess the preconditions for every political value simultaneously. The 
preconditions for modern liberty make impossible those for liberty of the ancients, for example. 
Yet this allows for the possibility of there being political values that nevertheless cannot be 
political values for us, and utopian or radical speculation which takes the form of exploring those 
values that fall into the former category but not the latter is a reasonable activity. We might ask 
whether spending a lifetime engaged in exploring values that could only pertain in conditions so 
radically different from our own is a sensible pursuit And there are questions about the 
intellectual motivations for wanting to study politics in that way rather than through a focus on 
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our actual political world which we still struggle to properly understand. Yet there is a significant 
difference between an enterprise being mistaken and its being unwise. And the general point 
remains that only the most outlandish utopianism - that which is unintelligible as political at all - 
is ruled out by the account that has been offered here. 
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